WHEN TWO GIANTS SIT AT THE SAME TABLE: THE NBA – EUROLEAGUE NEGOTIATION AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN BASKETBALL

Author: Dimitris Dallas  | 10 May 2026

Introduction

European basketball is going through what may turn out to be the most consequential negotiation in its modern commercial history. On 28 April 2026, in Geneva, three actors that have circled each other with mutual suspicion for decades—FIBA, the NBA, and EuroLeague—once again sat  at the same table. A few days later, the discussions moved on to Barcelona. The agenda is deceptively simple to describe and exceptionally hard to deliver: how to design the top tier of European club basketball for the next decade, with the NBA Europe project targeted to tip off in October 2027.

For an outside observer the story may read like a sports business item: investment funds, franchise fees, television rights, valuations rising from €1.5 billion to a projected €5 billion by 2030. Read more carefully, however, the case is a textbook negotiation in real time. It involves multiple parties with overlapping but non-identical interests, sharply asymmetric power, internal constituencies that constrain each negotiator, time pressure, ambiguous BATNAs, the constant interplay of competition and cooperation, and emotions and identity considerations that no spreadsheet captures. It is, in short, a contemporary event in which the underlying mechanics of negotiation theory become visible.

The aim of this article is not to predict the outcome—at the time of writing, no one can—, but to use the case as a lens through which to examine the negotiation principles at work. After describing the background and the parties, the article identifies the key dynamics at the table: the structure of the deal, BATNAs and leverage, the shift from positional to integrative bargaining, the role of the constituents, time pressure, and the interpretive role of culture and identity. A final section draws the broader lessons for negotiators.

Part A: The Setting

A.1 A brief history of a long rivalry

The relationship between EuroLeague and FIBA, and between EuroLeague and the NBA, has been shaped by a foundational rupture. In 2000–01 the most powerful European clubs broke away from FIBA’s club competition and created what is today EuroLeague Basketball, a privately governed, semi-closed competition controlled by its shareholder clubs. FIBA, the global governing body, retained the national teams and developed its own club tournament, the Basketball Champions League. The result was a fragmented European landscape and an enduring institutional tension between the clubs’ commercial autonomy and FIBA’s regulatory authority.

The NBA observed this fragmentation from a distance for years. By 2025, however, “NBA Europe” had moved from concept to plan. NBA Commissioner Adam Silver and Deputy Commissioner Mark Tatum publicly framed the initiative as an opportunity to be “built with European basketball, not over its ruins.” The bid process opened in early 2026; by the spring, more than 120 expressions of interest from investors and over 20 clubs, football powerhouses among them, had reportedly been received. Investment banks Raine Group and JP Morgan estimated franchise fees in the range of €435–870 million.

Two developments then transformed the negotiation. First, the NBA committed publicly to over $3 billion of capital, covering early-stage losses, guaranteed annual payments to clubs, and structured incentives. Second, EuroLeague replaced its CEO: Paulius Motiejūnas was succeeded by Chus Bueno, a former NBA executive with nearly a decade of experience. The Bueno appointment reset the climate. Where the previous regime had rejected the NBA’s partnership overtures, Bueno publicly stated that “everything is on the table”, explicitly including a merger of the two leagues.

In parallel, EuroLeague began its own transition to a franchise model. By the time of the Geneva meeting, the league had communicated to its clubs a plan to move to 22–24 teams for the 2027–28 season, of which 18 would be franchise-holders. Thirteen clubs already hold ten-year contracts. New franchise licences are being priced at €60–80 million, payable in instalments. The league’s overall valuation, today around €1.5 billion, is projected to rise to €3 billion at the moment of franchise launch and potentially to €5 billion by 2030.

A.2 The parties present at the table (as well as those absent from it.)

A first analytical observation is that the formal participants in the room are not the only ones whose interests are being negotiated. Several distinct constituencies are present, directly or indirectly:

• The NBA, represented operationally by George Aivazoglou (CEO, NBA Europe and Middle East) and at strategic level by Adam Silver and Mark Tatum. The NBA brings capital, brand, marketing know-how and global broadcasting reach.
• FIBA, represented by its leadership (Patrick Comninos for Champions League, FIBA’s executive layer for institutional matters). FIBA’s role is part regulator, part political broker; it offers the NBA institutional legitimacy in exchange for the prospect of repositioning its own Champions League as a second tier.
• EuroLeague Basketball, represented by President Dejan Bodiroga and CEO Chus Bueno. EuroLeague brings an established product, recognised brands such as Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, Panathinaikos, Olympiacos, Fenerbahçe and Anadolu Efes, and a renewed broadcasting partnership with IMG.
• The clubs, who in Geneva, notably, did not have a seat. The choice was deliberate: the EuroLeague leadership requested a clear mandate to negotiate without thirteen co-decision-makers in the room. The clubs are nevertheless the ultimate constituents whose ratification will be required.
• Potential investors and private equity, including Blackstone, CVC Capital Partners, RedBird, General Atlantic, BlackRock, BC Partners and Oaktree. They are not seated at the institutional table, but their willingness to commit capital is the resource that gives the NBA’s offer its credibility.
• National federations, governments and regulators are external constituents whose preferences (notably regarding closed leagues without promotion and relegation) constrain what any agreement can ultimately deliver.
• Players, coaches and supporters are the most distant constituents in the procedural sense, yet the most essential to the long-term success of any structure.

The first lesson is procedural and is familiar to any reader of the negotiation literature: every negotiation that looks like a two-party encounter is, on closer inspection, a multi-level game. As Robert Putnam famously argued in his “two-level games” framework, what is bargained at the table must also be ratified by constituents at home. In this case, the levels are at least four: the institutional level (NBA / FIBA / EuroLeague), the shareholder level (the EuroLeague clubs), the financial level (the investors), and the regulatory and public level (national federations, public opinion, the football clubs interested in fielding basketball franchises). A negotiator who optimises only for the table is highly likely to produce an agreement that fails on ratification.

Part B: The Structure of the Deal

B.1 What is actually being negotiated

It is tempting, especially in journalistic accounts, to describe the negotiation as being “about NBA Europe.” It is not,  at least not primarily. The Athletic’s recent reporting described the situation succinctly: “The NBA Europe is not in a launch phase; it is in an expensive battle over governance, valuation and control.” That formulation captures what experienced negotiators recognise immediately: the surface issue (a new league) is the vehicle through which deeper issues are being decided.

Behind the headline figures, three intertwined questions are being negotiated:

1. Governance. Who owns and controls the resulting structure? In the current iteration, NBA and FIBA would initially hold 52% of the equity in NBA Europe, with the participating clubs given the prospect of acquiring a majority over time. EuroLeague, in turn, has floated the possibility of equity participation in the new venture and even explored a merger or, in extremis, an outright NBA acquisition of EuroLeague.
2. Valuation. Each side is anchoring different numbers. The NBA’s process produces franchise valuations of $500 million to $1 billion. EuroLeague counters with its own trajectory: €1.5 billion today, €3 billion at franchise transition, potentially €5 billion by 2030. Whose number becomes the reference point will decisively shape any deal.
3. Control of the talent and product. A subsidiary but politically charged issue concerns whether NBA Europe clubs would be allowed to sign active NBA players from outside the player pool of free agents. The NBA’s reported answer —no, except for free agents— drew immediate complaint from a representative of a major football-backed bidder, who told The Athletic: “It becomes a feeder league for the NBA, and that’s not something anyone really wants.” That objection captures, in one sentence, the entire problem of asymmetric power.

These three layers, governance, valuation and control, interact. A concession on valuation can be exchanged for a stronger governance position; a concession on control of player movement can compensate for a smaller equity share. The mistake is to negotiate them in isolation. Skilled negotiators package issues precisely so that what one side values most (control, for the NBA) can be exchanged for what the other side values most (valuation and brand protection, for EuroLeague). This is the core insight of integrative bargaining as set out by Fisher, Ury and Patton in Getting to Yes: do not bargain over positions; identify the underlying interests and create joint value by trading across issues of differing priority.

B.2 From a fixed pie to joint value

For most of the past two decades the EuroLeague-NBA-FIBA relationship operated under a distributive logic. As seen in the Peace of Nicias and other ancient precedents, a ‘fixed pie’ mindset inevitably renders diplomatic agreements brittle. Each side viewed European basketball as a finite market to be defended, captured or partitioned. The result was institutional standoffs and a chronic underexploitation of the commercial potential.

The current round of discussions, by contrast, contains the seeds of an integrative logic. Several structural features push the parties toward joint value creation:

• Asymmetric resources. The NBA brings capital and global commercial reach; EuroLeague brings established European brands, sporting credibility and a working competitive structure. Neither can replicate quickly what the other already has.
• A larger pie is genuinely available. EuroLeague’s own internal projections move from €1.5 billion to €5 billion in less than five years; the NBA’s projections for NBA Europe imply a multi-billion broadcasting and franchise market. If the two products fragment European demand, the pie shrinks; if they integrate, it grows.
• The investor pool is shared. The same private equity funds that the NBA is courting are also the most plausible buyers of EuroLeague franchise licences. Two bidding wars for the same money would damage both leagues.

Bueno’s framing in his interviews is striking from a negotiation-theory standpoint. “We will both negotiate, and we both are trying to do what’s the best deal for our partners. We have to win for everyone. If there is someone that is winning the negotiation, but isn’t balancing the execution, the execution is not going to work.” This wording encapsulates the core insight that an agreement which one side experiences as a defeat will not be implemented in good faith, even if it is technically signed. Implementation is part of the negotiation, not a follow-up.

Part C: BATNA, Leverage and the Use of Pressure

C.1 BATNA on both sides

The Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement is the single most useful concept a negotiator can carry into a room. It is also, in this case, a moving target.

For the NBA, the BATNA is the unilateral launch of NBA Europe in 2027 with twelve licensed franchises and four qualifying teams, without EuroLeague participation. Silver and Tatum have made clear that this option remains live: more than 120 investors have expressed interest, several football superpowers—including reported names like Paris Saint-Germain and Manchester City Football Group entities—are positioning themselves, and the NBA has reportedly committed to absorb early losses and guarantee club revenues. The NBA’s BATNA is therefore credible, but not costless. A unilateral launch creates a fragmented market, splits investors, faces political resistance in several European countries (notably regarding closed-league models without promotion and relegation), and risks a confrontational climate with the existing rights-holders of EuroLeague’s marquee clubs.

For EuroLeague, the BATNA is the franchise transition that is already underway: ten-year contracts with 13 core clubs, new franchise licences at €60–80 million, growth from €1.5 billion to €3 billion in valuation. EuroLeague’s BATNA is also credible; Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, the Greek and Turkish powerhouses, and a refreshed media-rights partnership give it real autonomy. However, this BATNA is also vulnerable. The Athletic-reported information that several clubs’ EuroLeague licences expire at the end of 2025–26 and that “several clubs have not signed” the renewal documents creates an opening: if even one or two top brands defected, EuroLeague’s negotiating position would be seriously weakened.

This is the textbook case in which both parties’ BATNAs are real, neither is overwhelming, and each side’s BATNA is partially endogenous to what the other side does. The NBA’s $3 billion commitment is, among other things, a BATNA-strengthening move: it signals that the NBA can credibly proceed without EuroLeague. The EuroLeague’s franchise transition, long ten-year contracts, the projected valuation jump, is the mirror move: it strengthens EuroLeague’s BATNA by locking clubs in before the NBA’s launch window opens.

C.2 Pressure as a tactical tool

Mononews framed the NBA’s $3 billion announcement as “the strongest message yet to the European basketball market, to investors, but above all to the EuroLeague.” This is pressure exercised through demonstration of resources. It functions on multiple levels: it raises the cost of EuroLeague’s BATNA (clubs that defect can be promised guaranteed payments), it widens the audience watching the negotiation (investors, media, federations), and it activates EuroLeague’s internal heterogeneity (some clubs are tempted, others are determined to defend the existing structure).

Pressure tactics are well-known in the literature, and well-known to be double-edged. As classical works on negotiation power emphasise (and as practitioners learn quickly), overt displays of force can shift the dynamic from problem-solving to confrontation. They can also, paradoxically, reduce one’s own flexibility: once a $3 billion figure is public, walking away from it becomes politically expensive. The NBA’s communication strategy here is sophisticated. It pairs hard pressure (the figures, the timeline, the bidder pipeline) with soft language (“we are happy to build this with European basketball,” “for the good of European basketball, the best outcome would be to partner with EuroLeague”). The dual register is deliberate: it says simultaneously “we will do this without you” and “but we would much rather do it with you.”

The fact that the EuroLeague clubs were not seated in Geneva should be read in the same light. By keeping the clubs out of the room, the EuroLeague leadership avoided three risks: that internal disagreements would be visible, that the clubs would be lobbied directly by NBA representatives, and that a fragmented mandate would weaken the leadership’s authority. This is the structural counterpart to coalition management: when a coalition is heterogeneous, its negotiator’s authority depends on speaking with one voice in front of the counterparty.

Part D: The Constituents Behind the Negotiator

D.1 The internal table

Every external negotiation rests on an internal one. Fisher and Ury’s emphasis on the principal-agent problem is acutely visible here. The EuroLeague’s CEO, Chus Bueno, must satisfy thirteen core shareholder clubs whose interests diverge sharply: Real Madrid is reportedly seeking a 5+5 contract instead of a flat 10-year deal; Fenerbahçe and Villeurbanne have signalled a willingness to commit to a ten-year deal; smaller clubs face entirely different financial calculations. Bueno’s own background, a decade with the NBA, is described by Tatum as making him a potential “bridge between FIBA, us and the EuroLeague clubs”. That framing is true and telling. A negotiator whose biography spans both sides has access to a unique kind of legitimacy: he can credibly tell each side that he understands the other.

The mirror-image challenge exists on the NBA side. Silver, Tatum and Aivazoglou must persuade the existing thirty NBA owners that European expansion will not dilute domestic franchise values. Hence, the reportedly planned arrangement under which the US owners would not draw revenue from the new league for the first several years, while the European franchises receive guaranteed annual payments. This is a quiet but consequential internal concession. It signals that the NBA’s principals, i.e. the franchise owners, have agreed to defer return on their investment, presumably in exchange for long-term equity appreciation. Without that internal alignment, no external deal could be signed, let alone executed.

This is where Putnam’s two-level-game framework yields a concrete prediction: agreements survive ratification only when each negotiator has correctly read his “win-set”; the range of outcomes that his constituents will accept. A deal that is brilliant at the table but outside one side’s win-set will not survive. The Geneva and Barcelona meetings are, in this sense, as much exercises in mapping the other side’s win-set as they are exercises in proposing terms.

D.2 The role of identity and legitimacy

A theme that recurs in the European responses to the NBA project is identity. Specifically, the political and cultural meaning of European football-derived ownership models, of promotion and relegation, of supporter cultures organised around national leagues, and of the European resistance to closed franchise structures imported from North American sport. As reporting from Greek and international outlets has consistently noted, “in many European countries there are political and institutional reactions against a closed league model, without promotion and relegation”.

This is not a peripheral consideration. It echoes a dynamic of cultural distance and of the role of perception in negotiation: when one side of a negotiation interprets the other’s proposal as an assertion of cultural superiority, even materially attractive offers can be rejected. The NBA’s careful rhetorical work, Silver’s repeated framing of partnership “for the good of European basketball”,  is best read not as soft messaging but as a structural response to a real risk. If NBA Europe is perceived as a take-over of European basketball, the political and regulatory costs may exceed the commercial benefits, however attractive the financials.

Bueno’s instinct, “if there is someone that is winning the negotiation, but isn’t balancing the execution, the execution is not going to work”, captures the same point from the other side. A negotiation in which one party feels its identity has been overridden produces formal agreements whose substantive implementation is fragile.

Part E: Time, Tempo and the Use of Deadlines

The 2027–28 launch target is the deadline that organises everything. It is firm enough to discipline both sides. It ends speculation about whether NBA Europe will happen at all and yet it remains far enough away to allow careful staging. The negotiation calendar reflects this tempo: expression-of-interest phase closed, second phase (with the modified business plan shared with potential investors) just concluded, EuroLeague–NBA bilateral discussions in Geneva and Barcelona, EuroLeague’s own franchise transition window of 12–14 months, and the June 2026 deadline for confirming long-term club commitments.

Time pressure cuts both ways, and the parties know it. For the NBA, every month that passes without a partnership agreement increases the risk of having to launch unilaterally,  which is feasible but suboptimal. For EuroLeague, every month creates additional space for individual clubs to be approached separately and tempted by NBA proposals. The U.S.–Iran talks have been noted in a different context, deadlines are negotiation instruments in their own right: they concentrate attention, force prioritisation, and reveal which issues each side can give up under pressure. They are also dangerous, because poorly-managed deadlines  can collapse a deal that  would have closed had there been more time.

The careful sequencing of the present negotiation, staged investor phases, separate EuroLeague franchise track, public statements timed to reinforce private signals, suggests that both sides understand the tactical architecture of time. The risk is that the calendar will become hostage to events outside the table: a club defection, a regulatory ruling, a political intervention from one of the European governments whose national federations are observers to all this.

Part F: The Lessons

Drawing back from the specifics, the NBA Europe negotiation illustrates several principles that are central to negotiation research and teaching. 

First, separate the issue from the process. What looks like a single negotiation about a new league is in reality a negotiation about governance, valuation and control, conducted simultaneously with constituents and against alternatives. Treating these as one issue produces deadlock; treating them as a package opens the space for trades.

Second, manage your BATNA carefully,  including how it is perceived. Both the NBA’s $3 billion commitment and EuroLeague’s franchise transition are BATNA-strengthening moves. Their value is only partly in what they would deliver if executed; their value is also in the message they send across the table. A credible alternative is leverage; an incredible one is a bluff.

Third, integrative bargaining requires the right conditions, and those conditions can be created. The arrival of Chus Bueno changed the climate not because the underlying interests had shifted but because the relational architecture had. A negotiator with credibility on both sides of the table can unlock options that no amount of formal proposal-making can produce on its own.

Fourth, the people not in the room are decisive. The clubs that were absent from Geneva are the ratifying constituency. The investors who are not at the table are the financiers of any agreement. The regulators and federations who are observers will determine whether what is signed can be implemented. A negotiation strategy that does not actively manage these external audiences is incomplete by design.

Fifth, identity and legitimacy matter, usually decisively when they are ignored. European basketball is not a blank market. Its supporters, leagues and historical clubs are the substrate on which any commercial structure must rest. Agreements that are felt to be impositions tend to be implemented poorly even when they are signed reluctantly. Agreements that recognise the dignity of all parties, by contrast, generate the cooperative behaviour that makes implementation work.

Sixth, time is a tool, not a constraint. The 2027 launch window, the June 2026 club deadline, the staged investor phases, these are not external pressures imposed on the parties. They are choices, made by negotiators, used to produce focus and discipline. The skill is in setting deadlines that motivate without producing panic, and in protecting the calendar from external shocks.

Conclusion

At the time of writing, no one knows how the NBA–EuroLeague negotiation will end. The most likely outcomes, full partnership, equity participation by EuroLeague in NBA Europe, a parallel coexistence of two top-tier competitions, or an eventual merger, remain genuinely open. What is already clear is that the case is unusually instructive for negotiation analysis precisely because it is happening in plain sight, with sophisticated actors, real stakes, and visible moves.

The case offers something more than a passing topical interest. It is a contemporary, high-stakes example of how the textbook negotiation principles taught, interest-based bargaining, BATNA management, the two-level game, the role of legitimacy and identity, and the strategic use of time operate in the field. The next twelve months will not decide just  the future of European basketball. They will, for those who watch closely, function as a real-world seminar in negotiation, conducted at the highest level by experienced practitioners, with billions of euros and the loyalty of millions of supporters on the line.

The basketball will, of course, be played on the court. The decisive game is being played somewhere else.

Selected References

• Bozionelos, N. (2026, 28 April). Παιχνίδι δισεκατομμυρίων στη Γενεύη για EuroLeague και NBA, χωρίς τις ομάδες στο τραπέζι. Mononews.gr.
• Bozionelos, N. (2026, 27 February). NBA Europe: Το στοίχημα της συμμαχίας με τη EuroLeague και το τηλεοπτικό deal δισεκατομμυρίων. Mononews.gr.
• Bozionelos, N. (2025, 21 November). NBA Europe: Λίγκα δισεκατομμυρίων, με ‘εισιτήριο’ έως 870 εκατ. ευρώ και ουρές επενδυτών. Mononews.gr.
• Τα 3 δισ. που αλλάζουν το ευρωπαϊκό μπάσκετ και το σχέδιο πίεσης του NBA Europe προς την EuroLeague. (2026, 8 May). Mononews.gr
• Feronas, T. (2026, 8 May). NBA και FIBA πατούν το γκάζι για το λανσάρισμα του NBA Europe. Sport24.gr.
• Konstantopoulos, D. (2026, 6 May). The Athletic για το NBA Europe: Εκεί βρίσκεται το εγχείρημα σήμερα — μια ακριβή μάχη για τη διοίκηση, την αποτίμηση και τον έλεγχο. Sport24.gr.
• Stavrou, C. (2026, 8 May). EuroLeague: Η μετάβαση στην εποχή των franchise και η εκτόξευση της αξίας της διοργάνωσης μέχρι το 2030. Sport24.gr.
• Vorkunov, M. (2026, 6 May). NBA Europe, the EuroLeague and the expensive battle over governance, valuation and control. The Athletic / The New York Times.
• “NBA, EuroLeague to meet this week to talk partnership. (2026, April).  Hoops Rumors
• NBA Europe plans are getting clearer and might change the balance of power. (2026, 29 April).  Open Court Basketball

Negotiation Theory References

• Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (2011). Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (3rd ed.). Penguin Books.
• Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–460.
• Lax, D. A., & Sebenius, J. K. (1986). The Manager as Negotiator. Free Press.
• Raiffa, H. (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press.
• Ancient Negotiations and Modern Theory: Power, Pressure, and Political Legitimacy. (2026, March).  Mercury Negotiation Academy. mna.gr/blog-page.
• Χρόνος και πίεση: Πώς επηρεάζουν οι προθεσμίες τις ειρηνευτικές διαπραγματεύσεις — η περίπτωση των σχέσεων Η.Π.Α.–Ιράν. (2026, April).  Mercury Negotiation Academy. mna.gr/blog-page.